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In this chapter, u'e will give a surunary of the argument ancl results of
this study. We wil l  f i rst re-state the most important points of departure
ancl our theoretical and empirical research goals. We will continue u'ith
an overview of the theorv developed in Chapters 2 and 3 ancl the main
results of our empir ical analyses. We wil l  try to give some explanations
for the occasions lvhere the theory fails. Finally, we will forrnulate sorne
of the main conclusions we have been able to draw from this research.
Points of departure and researcÀ goals
The research reported in this stucly started as an attempt to integrate
two clifferent traditions in the fielcl of cabinet composition ancl clurability.
The first is the garne theory traclition. There, simple antl parsirnonrous
cabinet rnoclels have been developed that can be testecl easi ly using data
orr cabinet goverrrrnents in \\'estern rnrrlti-party ciernocracies. The seconcl
is the "cornparative cabinets" tradit ion. There, theories of cabinet com-
position ancl/or clurability are clevelopecl in which system chzrrilcteristics
are expl ici t lv takcn into account.
The coal i t ion theory tracl i t ion faces some l irnitat ions. First of al l ,  i rr
the "classical" tht 'or ies norr-winnirrg coal i t iorrs (minority cabinets) cannot
be predicted as rat ional outcornes. Second, most theories are ver].  gcneral:
coal i t ion thcorists havt: fai lecl to include system characterist ics in their
models. Tldrcl. the fzrct that cabinets are formect by the players of the
garne is not explicitly taken into account in most cabirret rnoclels. This
irnplies that the preferences and the limitations of the players of the garnc
receive insrrf l ic ient attentiun.
In the conrparative cabinet tradition, ans$'ers were fourrci to solve
sorne problern areas in the game theory tradit ion. First,  i t  rvas shorvrr that
minority cabinets coulcl be predictecl.  Seconcl, party systern characteris-
t ics were takerr into accourrt,  sometimes in the forrn of typologies. This,
however, hacl some rregativc consequences. Most troubl ing is the fact that
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system characterist ics wcrc largely introducecl on an acl hoc basis. That
is, a clear theoretical basis from which the specif ic party systerl  ch:rrac-
terist ics that rvere incluclecl in the theories were clrarvn is rnissing.
We arguecl that i t  is possible to point to certain players in the garne
u'ho, theoretical ly. can be considered more porverful than other pl:r ,yers.
These are the dorninant :rnd cerrtral players. Thesc players receive their
irnportant posit ions in the game from the structurer or thc r:haracterist ics
of the garne. Therefore, a focus on games in which the irnportant role of
these players is appreciatecl,  Ieads us to aclopt a rrew parsirnoniorts ap-
proach in which system characterist ics can l>e introduced. We formulated
the fol lorving theoretical research goal for this stucly:
Tlr: tlteoretical gctal of t,hi"s study'rs to clevelop an integtatr,'rl ap-
lttoaclt, ;rs :rn exten^sion of the gane thexry' approach to cabinet forrna-
ttr-rn.
o tlrat c.an be. rr"sed to study botÀ cabinet contpositir.nt (o{ lttfih nta-
jorit,y ancl ntinority cabinets) and dulabrlrty,
o tltttt, .incJu cics systerrr char a ct eristi t:s,
o tltitt, t:xplic.itly starts at the level of the plaT'els of tltt game.
o tlta,t, rncftrrftrs both "office-sei:1ring" iutcl "polic.y-.seeking" elernerit.s.
In a<iclition, rve also formulatecl arr crnpiric:rl reseerrch goal. \\? ar-
guecl thzr,t  rnost of the recurrt theoretical approaches in the f ield of cabinet
c'ornposit ion and drrrabi l i ty v'ere testecl ernpir ical ly in a rather w'e:rk rnan-
nerr: eithcr rvi th zr large rmrnber of countr ics in a specif ic t i rne perioci,  or
with onc or just :r  fcw corurtr ies chrr ing a lorrger t irne perio<1. Thus, r: lzr, ims
c.rf  empir ical succcss canrrot be cxtended lreyorrcl the choscrr data set or
t irnc periori .  \Ve thereforc forrnrr latcd the fol lowing crnpir ical goal for this
stucly:
The enpuir-.al goal of tltis sÍur/1' rs to test tltt' 1tlo1tosecl tltertt'tical
fi';rrrreri'r.,r'k lty ctnfrontilg it wrtl tlata of t:altinet cornposrtir.rn anrl rlttra-
l;iLitv, taktn fir-,lr ;rs m;r,n.y r:orrntlrcs as l.,ossil-rle r.,vr:.r' a long t,intt:1tt:t'iocl.
The theort 'rvas r lcvr: lopcd irr Chaptcrs 2 artcl  3. I t  rvas testt ' r l  in Chalrters 6
a,r ir l  7 using a, dat:r set of 382 cabirrcts of Wcstern rnult i-partv ciemocrrr,cies.
hr Chaptcr , l  rve r l iscusserl t i re clzrta and olrcrat iorral izat iorrs. in Ch:rpter 5
wc àSS(:rss( '( i  the erlpir icrLl i rnportarice of solre of orrr theolet ical clcrr icnts
lry exarnirr ing thrcc courrtr ics sepa,rately.
Tlte tlxtr.y'
\ \ i '  f i rst <lcscribcrl  the garut '  theoly concepts of trvo players that zrrc rnore
irnportarrt  for tht,  pol i t ical coal i t ion garne, than other playt-rs. Thcsc are
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The concepts of the dourinant a.rrcl cerrtral players share a feature
that rnakes i t  possiblc to use thern as system characterist ics. The dornirrant
player arrd the central player are not necessarily present in every rveightecl
majori ty garne.
Wherr we view the seat distr ibution of the pol i t ical part ies in a
certain parl iament as a weighted majori ty game, then the presence or ab-
sence of parties that adhere to the definitions of clominance and centrality
characterize that parl iamentary seat distr ibution or, more general ly, that
parl iament. Thus, thesc concepts can be used to characterize ganres in
one specif ic sense by their prescrrce or absence.
We cornbinecl these garne theory based system characteristics irr a
tvpology of parl iarncrrts. Exanrining the presence or absence of donrirrant
ancl central part ies in parl iaments sir lul taneously, rve arr ivecl at the fol-
lowing five classes of parliarnents:
r DCP type: A <lonrinant party is present, a central party is present
ancl thef identify orre arrcl the sarne party, the dorrrinant cerrtral
partY.
r DP-CP type: A clominant party is present, a central party is prescnt,
but they clo rrot iclentify the sarne party.
r DP typc: A clorninant party is prerserrt,  a central partv is absent.
o CP type: A clorninant party is absent, a cerrtral party is preserrt.
o - typc: Neither <lominarrt part l '  lor central party arc present.
This typology is a cornbination of trvo garne theory basecl systern
characteristics. It is ;r r:onstellation of system charai:teristics with fivc val-
ues, one for each pari i :rmentary type. Thus, i t  part ly fulf i l ls the theoretical
goal for this study. \ \rc used this typology as oul basis for the clevelop-
merrt of predictions for cabinet cornposition ancl drrrability, the other part
of our theoretical resc:rrch goal.
Horveverr, before ernbarkirrg on the clerivation of preciictions ancl hy-
potheses for al l  parl iarrrentarl '  types. rve cxamine<l the 241 parl iamentary
scat clistriltrrtions irrc:lucled irr our data set. We found that the DP tvpe
and the "-" type lackcd ernpir ical relevarrce. We therr deciclcr l  to continue
rvith theory clcveloprlent for orr ly the empir ical relcvant pari iarncrrtary
types.
In thc f inzr. l  ser:t ion of Chapter 2, t ;rking the special posit ions of the
clorninant ancl/or centrzrl  playcrs in the parl iamerl lary game zrs our srart iug
poirrt ,  rve dcveloped lrasic prerl ict iorr prirrc: iples an<l hypothescs for czrlr irrct
conrposition ancl clurability. This was tlrirre separately for the DC P, DP -
CP. and CP parl iarncrrtary types. Ther precl ict iorrs rvere cl irccted at lroth
majori ty a,rr11 rninori ty cabincts. We also developcd hypoiheses dircctet l
at differenccs betweerr parliarncrrtary types.
In Chzrpter 3. we signalerl  a problematic point associ:r, tecl rvi th our
























186 Cabinets in multi-party dernocracies
and C P parliaments, the fact that the preclictions clo not deliver a unlque
predicted cabinet but a seÍ of predicted cabinets. Thus, the predict ions
are rather unspecif ic.
We proposed two theoretical solut ions to solve this probiem. The
first was to add an account of the rational cabinet preferences of our
structural ly important part ies to the init ial  predict ions. The second solu-
tion consisted of a theoretical .link between the majority cabinet parts of
our initial cabinet composition predictions, and the "classical" Mini.mal
Connected Winning Theory and Minimal Winning Theory. Both theo-
ret ical solut ions enabled us to state more specif ic predict ions of cabinet
cornposition for DCP, DP - CP arrd CP parliamentary types.
The following conclusion can be drawn with regard to our theoretical
reserach goal:
o An integration of game theory basecl and comparative cabinets mod-
els of cabinet composition and durability is possible. We have shown
that a game theory basecl account of systern characterist ics coulcl bc
cleveloped. We used our typology, combined with a player oriented
approach, to formrrlate preclictions of cabinet composition and clura-
bility for clifferent parliarnentary types.
Our empirical research goal requirecl a broadly based ernpirical arral-
ysis of the derived predict ions and hypotheses. I ts results are cl iscussecl
below.
Resu.lÍs of the analyses ancl concJusions
We exam.inecl our precl ict ions and hypotheses with a clata set of 382 cabi-
nets in 14 Western rnult i-party clernocracies betrveen 1918 ancl 1988. The
foilorving countries were incluclecl: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France (Fourth and Fifth Republics), Germany (Weimar and Federal Re-
public), Icelancl,  Ireland, Israel,  I taly, Luxembourg, The Netherlancls, Nor-
way ancl Srveclen.
The rnain rcsults of the empir ical analysis are:
r that our typology provides a good instrument to account for a num-
ber of obscrvcd clifferences irr cabinet cornposition and durability in
Wcstcrrr nurl t i -party clerrocracies, anci
r that it is fruitful tci usc zr player-orierrtccl approach withirr the corr-
text of the typology, especial iy rvhen t ire concept of central piayers
is t:rkerr irrto accourrt.
o that the theoretical argument cleveloped in Chapter 3 to procluce
srnal ler predict ion sets than the basic predict ions for majori ty cab-
rnerts wns successful.
\\'e will give an overview of the most important results of the analyses to















































It was found, as predicted, that most minority cabinets have been
fornred tn DP - CP parliaments, followed by essential DCP parhannents,
and that the srnallest number of minority cabinets have been formed ín C P
parliaments. We also found, as predicted, that the mean cabinet durability
was highest irr essential DCP parliaments, followed by CP parliaments.
and was lowest ín DP - CP parl iaments. However, for this latter result we
could only confirm the preclicted direction - the result was not statistically
significant.
With regard to cabinet composit ion, we found that the central player
generally delivered irnpressive results. Taking our typology of parliaments
as our point of focus, we carr make a rnore srrbt le assessment of i ts success.
The central player is most successful for cabinet composit ion when
it is dominant at the saure time. That is, most majority and minority
cabinets in DCP parl iaments include the dominant central part ies. I ts
inclusion rate was relatively high too in rnajority and minority cabinets in
CP parl iarnents, but somewhat lower than ít  DCP parl iarnents. I t  was
found that most majori ty cabinets in DP - CP parl iaments clo inchrcle
both the non-extrerle clominant part ies ancl the ccntral part ies. The dom-
inant and central parties were included together in rrajority cabinets on
a much lower level when the dominant parties were extreme. Ccntral par-
ties, however, were in almost all cascs irrcluded in thc cabinets. The orrly
area wirere the central parties are included on a lower level, is the area of
mirrori ty cabinets tn DP - CP parl iaments.
When we rnake a similar assessrnent from the standpoint of the clom-
inant player, we carr conclude that i t  is powerful with respect to cabinet
corrposition only when it is central at the same tirne, in DC P parlia-
ments. I ts results are somewhat weaker tn DP -CP parl iaments. For this
parliarnerrtary type it was found, however, that the closer the dorninant
and central part ies were on the left-r ight dimension, the more often they
forrned majori ty cabinets in which both were included.
On the basis of our development of further theoretical elements in
Chapter 3 wc also tested preclictions that the central parties would forrn
Minimal Conflict, Minimal Distance, Minirnal Connected Winning, and
Minimal Winning czr,birrets. In Chapter 6 we concludecl that the preclictiorr
sets of these specif ic predic:t iorrs are smaller than the precl ict ion sets of thc
basic predict ions torva,rd majori ty cabinets in each of the parl iarnerrtary
types.
For DC P parliaments the specific predictions wcre developecl for
donrirrant cerrtral parties, ín DP - CP parliaments separate preclictiorrs
were tcstecl for the cases in wirich dominarrt parties were inchrclecl in the
cabinets and when they were not. I t  was found that the predict ive capa-
bi l i t ies variecl among parl iamentary types. For DCP parl ianrents, rnost
cabinet predict ions hacl small  predict ion sets, but sorr)e were confirrned at
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prerdict ion sets. but also relat ively high confirmation rates. Final l l ' ,  the
resrr l ts for DP - CP parl iaments are sornewhere in between. NÍost precl ic-
tions had small pre<liction sets and were confirmed at low levels rvhile trn'o
predict ions, MW2 and MCW2, harl larger precl ict ion sets but also nrore
confirmations in the data.
Wc hacl developecl one main hypothcsis for cabinet durabi l i ty: cabinets
that include the central part ies would, on average, be nrore drrrable than
cabirrets that do not inclucle the central part ies. \Vhen tested separately
for the dif ferent parl iarnentary types, i t  was found that there are orcat
diffcrencers in the results.
Tho hypothesis rvas confimrecl stronpqly in DCP parl izrrnents, for
botlr  rnajori ty an<l minority cabincts. Ho*' 'ever, for DP - CP parl innients
ancl CP parl iarncrrts, i t  was founcl, that c::rbirrcts that do not inclrrdc thc
central part ies \Áiere more durable than cabinets that do inclucle the central
par t ies .
We re-assesscd the well-known stat ist ical ly signif icant posit ir .e ef-
fect of the Minimal \Vinrring arrd \{inirnal Connectcd \Vinning statrrs of
cabinets on cabinet durabi l i ty in the l ight of our typologv. Stat ist ical ly
sigrrificant positive effects werc founcl for D P - C P and CP parliamcrrts.
Horvever, srrch arr effect was riot fourrd for essential DC P parliannents.
Thus, here too, i t  is shotvrr th:rt  orrr typology "matters". i .c. has;trr intt .r-
vcning cffect on c;rbinct durability.
The posit ive conclusion that carr be clrawn fronr thest: results. cs-
pecial ly rvi th respect to orrr rnain czr, l>inet cluralr i l i ty hypothesis. is that
orrr tvpologv accourrts for differences in cabinet durability in trulti-party
dcnrocr; lcies. Horvever, thc negative corrclusion is that our thcoretical ly
preclicted effect w:rs not confirrned il a part of the clata where it lvas cx-
pccterl  to br corrf irrred. In fact, this is thc rnost irnport:rnt ar€.a lvhcrc our
basic theory fai ls.
\\ie exarnincd one possible explanatiorr for the failure of orrr ir1 -
lrot lresis Á C P parl iarrrcnts: for this parl izr.nentary t) 'pe rro <l ist i trct ion
rvi ls nrarlc bctrveen sitrrat ions in which the cerrtrai party was at t l te s:rnre
t irnc thc largest pal ' ty in thc parl iarnent ancl si tu:rt iorrs in rvhich i t  rvas
not. Hou'cvt:r.  t tr is explanation, r". i th a somer.hat ad hoc charactcr in the
l ight of our theoretical frarnework <l ir l  not lrr ing thc cxpected solut iol ei-
ther. Evcn when the ccntral part ies are the largest part ies. their i r iclusion
in cabincts has a rregative effect on calrinet durability.
Otht:r reasons for thc fai lure of our thcory irr this resper:t  rna] '  bc
forrrrd irr sorne rnodel assumptions or operational izat ions. For instance,
irr orrr analyses rvc have ciroserr to inclucle al l  l rart ies knorvn to us. everr
rvheu tht 'y are very srnal l .  Irr  sornc' si trrat iol. ls vcry srnal l  l rart ics are ccntral
on the lcft-r iglrt  cl i rncnsion ancl:rre irrclurlerl  in cabintts formccl bl other
part ies in ordcr to kecp the ca,lr inct r:orrnccteri .  At thc sarnc t irne,, thc
Summary and conclusions
actual political power of such a party to "balance" the left and the right
in parliament and keep the cabinet in office, may be somewhat overstated
by our theory.
A more important reason for failure may be the simplifying assump-
tion of one single dominant ideological dimension. In our study, this was
operationalized using left-right scales. During the cabinet formation pro-
cess an agreement is developed with respect to the most important polit-
ical issues. It is easy to imagine that most of these can be found in the
sphere of socio-economic policy, i.e. in left-right related issues. Indeed we
find that the central player concept is very important when it comes to
the composition of cabinets. However, during the life-time of cabinets, a
small issue which is less (or not) related to the left-right dimension can
evolve into an important issue and cause a serious threat to the stability
of cabinets.
Finally, another important reason for failure can be that the cab-
inet preferences of parties other than the dominant and central parties
were not taken into account. In our theory we mainly emphasized the im-
portant role of dominant and central parties and their preferences. This
can be illustrated with the interaction effect found between parliamen-
tary type and the durability of minimal connected winning and minimal
winning cabinets (Section 7.6.2). There we found that the more one party
dominates the coalition (most in DC P parliaments, least in C P parlia-
ments) the less durable that coalition is. It will be remembered that for
both minimal winning and minimal connected winning cabinets we found
that they are least durable in DC P parliaments, and most durable in C P
parliaments. Clearly, the "dominance" of one party in a cabinet can be
made smaller by including more parties in the cabinet. This leads to the
formation of non-minimal winning and non-minimal connected winning
cabinets. Thus, the preferences of other parties can also play a role in
the process. However, this would have made our theoretical model more
complicated.
After this overview of the theory and its application to data of
cabinet composition and durability, we need to discuss one further point.
Possible extensions and further research
In this study a typological structure of parliaments has been developed,
using the virtues of the structural important players in the game. It was
applied to the research problem of cabinet composition and durability, one
of the fields in political science where positive theory has had a significant
impact. This approach, or elements taken from this approach, can be
applied also in other fields.
First of all, and most generally, it is possible to apply the approach
developed here to any problem of group decision making in which a weight
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and a pol icy posit ion on sorne relevant dimension can be attr ibuted to the
actors. Arr exarnple that comes to mind immediately in this respect is
group formation in the collective decison making processes in city and
provincial counci ls. I t  is also possible to study other governrnental bocl ies
in this respect.
Second, cabinet formation can be studied as a p.rocess. This can be
combined with the research reportecl in this book. Unti l  now, most cabi-
net studies, including this present one, have been devoted to the study of
cabirret coutposition, not to a study of cabinet formation as a process. Re-
cently, however, a number of new approar:hes have been developed in which
the process of cabinet formation was stucl ied (see for exarnple Baron, 19911
Laver ancl Shepsle, 1990a, b).
One of the most important aspects of an approach that corrsiders the
process is the party-selection phase. The process starts when one party,
or a representant of that party, receives from the President or Monarch
the manclate to form a government. This party wil l  assess which part ies
can be includecl in the government and which cannot. He will examine the
policy preferences of each party, anci wi l l  reach a conclusion as to n'hich
pzr,rt ies are interesting to include in the cabinet and which are not. This
can be modelecl rvi th "cost-benefi t" assessments, using expected ut i l i ty
argunrents. One can easi ly imagine that irr  moclels of such processcs certain
players in the garne can play rnore prominent roles than other players, for
exarnple the part ies that occrqry the central posit ion on the intportant
issue cl imensions.
The approach developecl in this strrdy can also Lre used to study
different parliarnentary situations in more tletail. We found that most
countr ies can, to a large extent, f i t  into one of the parl iamentary types.
However, changes betweerr parl ianrentary types within countr ies do oc-
cur. For example, during the seventies the parliamentary systerns of ltaly,
Israel ancl The Netherlarrcls transformetl frorn a clear DCP parliauren-
tary systerns to more or less clear DP - CP parl iamentary systcrns. An
interesting rrew research l ine can be cleveloped when these stmctural par-
liarnerrtary charrges are linkecl to the historical and political changes that
occurred in thesc countr ies. In such a research l ine i t  is irnportant to aclopt
a dynzrrnic theoretical approach instead of a stat ic approach.
